Introduction
The following poems-or verse-essays-are part of an on-going project with two principal and closely related aims. One is revive the fortunes of the broadly philosophical verse-essay, a genre that has been largely neglected over the past two centuries and more since its highpoint in the long literary eighteenth century. The other is to show how this can best be achieved through a formalist poetics involving the deployment of regular rhyme-schemes and likewise regular metrical structures played off against the shifting patterns of speech rhythm. This all runs very much counter to currently approved practice, at least among prominent (mostly academic) arbiters of taste, so I had better explain some of the issues raised by conjoining these two distinctly un-modish attempts.
The main thrust of avant-garde theory over the past few decades has been toward an idea of literary language that locates its resistance to passive or conformist habits of writing or reading primarily in 'the text'. This latter is then conceived-in post-structuralist fashion-as a site of conflicting significations that are defined in terms applying with equal pertinence to poetry or prose (for a fairly representative sampling of work in this vein, see Norris and Machin 1987) . That is, it tends to neglect matters of a formal (by which I mean chiefly metrical, rhythmic, prosodic, syntactic, or verse-structural) character so as to engage more intently with the textual and intertextual aspects of poetic discourse. These aspects are more amenable to treatment by thoseespecially philosopher-critics or theorists bred up on a mixture of post-Kantian idealism with post-PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 2 (2) (2017) structuralist ideas about language-who see it as their main role to mediate the relationship between poetry and theory. Although these critics do on occasion take note of certain formal features it is usually by way of a brief detour from that other, to them more absorbing and philosophically as well as poetically important business. It strikes me-no doubt as an interested party-that much of the contemporary poetry approved, promoted, anthologised, or encouraged by such criticism can itself fairly be said to suffer from a kindred defect. It often goes beyond the modernist revolt against 'traditional' rhyme and meter-a revolt quite compatible (as in T.S. Eliot) with a high degree of formal inventiveness in both respects-to something more like a cultivated disregard for such elements.
The result, in many cases, is a flattening-out of verse-rhythms through the lack of any metrical counterpoint. One feels that the poem might just as well have been written in prose since there is nothing-or nothing of a properly poetic, i.e., formally constrained but also formally inventive and liberating character-to warrant that generic description. This applies especially to the language poets (or L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poets, as they like to be known) who emerged as a loosely associated movement in the 1970's and occupied ground that, in principle at least, overlapped to a striking extent with the territory I have been trying to stake out here (see especially Andrews and Bernstein 1984; also Bernstein 1992 and Hejinian 2000; McCaffery 1986 and 2001; Perelman 1996; Silliman 1987; Ward 1993) . These poets, Charles Bernstein and Steve McCaffery among them, are highly self-conscious and theoretically aware about the kinds of effect they wish to achieve in creative practice and the kinds of relationship they seek to establish with various poetic and philosophical precursors. In brief: they reject (what they see as) the prevailing subjectivist or expressivist (i.e., neo-Romantic) ethos of much contemporary poetry; go in wholeheartedly for post-structuralist ideas of écriture, the 'revolution of the word', and the limitlessly plural or scriptible text; enthusiastically, and for just those reasons, endorse the Barthesian 'death of the author'; likewise approve the post-structuralist idea of literature's socio-political function as the undoing of bourgeois ideology by deconstructive, semioclastic, or other such textual means; and, again following Barthes, take the naturalisation of the signifier/signified dyad as the basic mechanism by which language colludes in our willing submission to the lures of 'common-sense' thinking. Along with these goes the further belief that the signifiers 'poetry' or 'poem' (not to mention 'poet') have for too long served to promote a notion of literary works as affording privileged access to realms of experience beyond reach of prosaic or rational grasp.
The language-poets advance this case with a passion clearly born of 1960s political-cultural ferment and transposed, via post-structuralism, to the register of a dissident or radical poetics squarely at odds with the whole bad hegemony of received languages and verse-forms. They alsoas scarcely needs adding-have a deep (and in some ways healthy) suspicion of the first-person subject whose agonies and ecstasies, along with more humdrum emotions, are the fulcrum of most poetry in the mainstream lyric tradition. I won't deny the appeal that such ideas have exerted, and continue to exert, on my own thinking about poetry and theory. Nobody who reads these pieces with an ear and eye to their formal (narrative as well as verse-poetic) aspects would be likely to take them as straightforwardly expressing my own beliefs or indeed the belief-set of any unified, autonomous, or integral first-person self. To that extent I am happy to acknowledge an affinity with PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 2 (2) (2017) what the language-poets-or their most influential promoters (usually the same people)-place high on their creative-critical agenda. There is also a genealogical connection in respect of our shared sources in that line of jointly poetic-philosophical writing that goes back through YaleSchool deconstruction to the Jena Romantics. However, in the case of the language poets, there is something too easily or unresistingly achieved about that two-way reciprocal passage between poetry and theory, or the fluency with which these writers modulate from a (nominal) poetry overtly engaged with issues in criticism and theory to a theoretically-angled criticism with claimsnot always very strongly borne out-to constitute poetry in itself. The result is very often a hybrid discourse that fails to match either the creative flair of the best literary theory or the subtlety, range and conceptual resources of a poetry that makes best use of verse techniques for its own distinctive purposes.
This can most plausibly be put down to a deficit of just those formal attributes, such as rhyme and meter, that the language poets frequently denounce as at best mere relics of an antiquated verse tradition and at worst a means of inducing compliance with the norms of bourgeois subjectivity.
On the contrary, I'd say: it is just those formal attributes that best, most effectively and durably exemplify poetry's power of resistance to ideological conditioning, whether by the sometimes restrictive effects of first-person (e.g., lyric) individualism or-more to the point here-by the subject's proclaimed dissolution into a multitude of intertextual discourses, codes and conventions. Hence the feeling of linguistic inertness in so much language-poetry and the impression it gives of endlessly announcing but never remotely achieving that revolution of the bourgeois signifying order first envisaged a full half-century ago by the left wing of French structuralist poetics (see for instance Belsey 1980; Kristeva 1984; Young 1981) . My verse-essay about Mallarmé is relevant here since it reflects on the various sources of a double and coimplicated movement of thought, one that starts from Mallarmé's diagnosis of a 'crisis' ([1986] (2010) afflicting the high culture of nineteenth-century French classicism and presages the increasing permeability of any generic boundary between poetry and theory, along with the erosion of those formal features that once underwrote (albeit in historically and culturally variable ways) that same distinction. Hence the current anti-formalist bias and, closely allied to that, the prejudice against any poetry that argues a case as distinct from deploying symbolist-approved modes of oblique, evocative, highly metaphoric, non-discursive, analogical, non-consecutive, spatially conceived, and hence maximally non-prosaic language.
However what this attitude gives to poetry in terms of expanded creative-imaginative horizons it promptly takes away in terms of formal resources and capacity to earn its keep as a discourse of reasoned dialogical exchange. The precedents again go a long way back, to the English Romantics at least, although it wasn't until recent times that the idea of radically re-jigging the poetry/prose dichotomy was translated from the realm of generalised precept to poetic practice. Thus Wordsworth ([1800] ) 1991) said that the relevant distinction was that between poetry and science, not poetry and prose, while Shelley ([1821] 2001)-with larger territorial aims in view-said that all major thinkers, discoverers, reformers, scientists and other visionary types should properly be accorded the title of poet. Yet neither of them, even Wordsworth in the prosier parts of Lyrical Ballads, went so far as to draw the inverse corollary of this and remove even those vestiges of PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 2 (2) (2017) rhyme and meter that remained of the old (now despised) eighteenth-century 'poetic diction'. That was left to the avatars of twentieth-century modernism and its various, often to begin with academically sponsored but nowadays far more widespread and popular manifestations.
Anti-formalism has had yet further harmful effects. One has been the regrettable division of labour between literary theorists working in self-conceived vanguard movements like post-structuralism or deconstruction and scholar-critics of a more traditional, often philological bent with a primary interest in prosody, metrics, stylistics, structuralist poetics, and genre-theory. (To be sure there are those, like Derek Attridge [1995; 2013] , who refuse that division and pursue both projects with notable success.) Meanwhile a good deal of recent poetry-including, non-coincidentally, some of the work most favoured by university-based critics-continues to make a point, even a chief virtue, of its indifference to such presumptively obsolete concerns. Moreover one gets the impression that a main requirement for any poem appearing in some metropolitan literary journals is that it bear no formal marks of being a poem except those of having an unaligned right-hand margin and, very often, a looser grammatical (not to mention thematic and argumentative) structure than one expects of decent prose. It seems to me that this has often gone along with a sizeable and uncompensated loss of those manifold expressive, technical, and (not least) philosophicalreflective resources that are there to be had from rhyme and meter. Anti-formalism and pantextualism can perhaps be seen as flipsides of the same post-Romantic coin, a coupling that I think has a lot to answer for in terms of current poetic and literary-critical practice.
Mallarmé ('A cast of dice . . . . '')
This is a poem about Mallarmé's symbolist poetics with an eye both to its formal innovations in verse-technique-his response to the 'crisis' he perceived as afflicting the classical tradition of French poetry-and to the themes of chance and necessity evoked most suggestively in Un coup de dés. Seeing no future in anything like the traditional rhyme-schemes and metrical forms which had entered that presumptive state of crisis Mallarmé set out to create a poetry of visual, spatial, and (perhaps) ultimately mystic-numerical import that would break with all such precedent. This would bring about the conditions for an epochal advance in the currently stalled unfolding of poetry's formal possibilities and expressive scope. Moreover it would show by such means how certain kinds of highly disciplined poetic creation-or certain modes of highly wrought analogical thought-might demonstrate (as promised in the poem's opening line) that 'a cast of dice will never abolish chance'.
My verse-essay makes its point contre Mallarmé by sticking resolutely to iambic pentameter (the national-cultural equivalent of the French alexandrine so despaired of by Mallarmé) and adopting a rhyme-scheme about as tight, 'classical' and (seemingly) restrictive as could well be conceived.
However this is just my point: that if we want a perfect analogy for the paradox that Mallarmé obliquely propounds, that is, the idea of chance (and hence, he implies, of freedom or creative choice) as somehow re-emerging on the far side of necessity then we could hardly do better than PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 2 (2) (2017) invoke the instances of poetic rhyme and metre. It is just such formal exigencies that may prompt the poet, even (or especially) when hard pressed, to all sorts of otherwise improbable discovery or invention. In which case, ironically enough, Mallarmé's theme in Un coup de dés might be said to find its most striking enactment or exemplification in just those features of the classical tradition whose obsolescence he so fervently proclaimed. At any rate such has been my experience during five years' work in the interstices of poetry-writing and poetics: that it is chiefly through those distinctive verse-attributes-their capacity to dislodge or side-track thought from its habitual linguistic-conceptual grooves-that poetry differs from prose. Or rather, since sweeping claims in that regard are always open to objection by counter-example: it is one chief line of defence for verse-essays like mine that their various turns of argument are carried, invigorated, sharpened, and sometimes sprung upon the rhyme-questing mind by the pressures and challenges of formal constraint.
My dear Degas, poems are not made out of ideas. They're made out of words.
The flesh is sorrowful, alas, and I have read all the books.
The work of pure poetry implies the elocutionary disappearance of the poet, who yields the initiative to words. The critic Florent Fels encountered … a proud, small old man, who dodged the obstacles in his path uncertainly. Behind the thick lenses of his spectacles, his eyes appeared enormous, like those of an insect searching for the last light.
Ross King, Mad Enchantment: Claude Monet and the Painting of the Water Lilies (2016)
Four minutes at the most, and then they die.
Years since I dreamed I'd get the colours right.
No painted lily graces the mind's eye.
Nice of Cezanne to praise me up, but why Make something wondrous of an old man's plight?
Ten minutes -more or less -and I'd get by
On memory plus technique as best I might.
Photography is one new trick I try
To conjure up their hues again despite Four minutes at the most, and then they die.
Time was when those four minutes used to fly
Yet hues would iridesce throughout their flight.
No painted lily graces the mind's eye. PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 2 (2) (2017)
My dear friend Clemenceau says I'll raise high The nation's cultural stock, but I take fright:
I'd rather he just spare a passing sigh
For all the hues now lost to vision's blight.
Giverny's my dream-world, yet a far cry
From what that vision once strove to requite:
The critics praise my lilies but apply
Mere words that spell them out in black and white.
The mind's its own place and disclaims what I
Read in each change of hue, however slight:
Then there's the pigments shifting as they dry
Through some strange interzone of day and night.
That eye of mine sees colours go awry Through cataracts that further cloud my sight.
I scarcely know where water ends and sky
Begins, so it's sheer chaos I invite:
How splendid our precursors who defy
The chaos by their colours clear and bright.
Some days there are when all that fake bonsai And other Japanese stuff seems just trite.
Georges says he'll fix it so the state will buy
And house my lilies if I just sit tight.
Four minutes at the most, and then they die. PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 2 (2) (2017) For what's the point of some cut-price Versailles
If likeness isn't your ambition's height?
A torment to me, that I won't deny, Yet still I prize those flickerings of the light.
Four minutes at the most, and then they die;
The Reality of the Past: two views
Realism about the past entails that there are numerous true propositions forever in principle unknowable. The effects of a past event may simply dissipate …. To the realist, this is just part of the human condition; the anti-realist feels unknowability in principle to be simply intolerable and prefers to view our evidence for and memory of the past as constitutive of it. The steady state we hoped we'd get
To know as truth timed out each au revoir. PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 2 (2) (2017)
Structuralism and Its Discontents
The mind cannot remain at rest in a mere repertorization of its own recurrent aberrations; it is bound to systematize its own negative self-insight into categories that have at least the appearance of passion, novelty, and difference.
Paul de Man, 'Roland Barthes and the Limits of Structuralism ' (1990) Neat theory, but I doubt it fits our case.
Granted, all signifiers slip and slide, Yet bygone signifieds still leave their trace.
The gap between might be just empty space
With nothing meant since meaning's open wide.
Neat theory, but I doubt it fits our case.
If breaking up seems easier to face
When past intent affords no future guide, Those bygone signifieds still leave their trace.
Splendid idea for structuralists to base
Their doctrine on, though here it's misapplied:
Too much gets lost in synchrony's embrace
As it canutes all thought of time and tide While bygone signifieds still leave their trace.
'If signs make sense,' they say, 'then it's by grace Of signifiers, not things signified.'
And if they say such doubts are out of place
Since theorists have the whole thing cut-and-dried, Then bygone signifieds still leave their trace.
Behold those structures crumbling apace.
Time-lapse affirms what synchrony denied.
Neat theory, but I doubt it fits our case. PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 2 (2) (2017) A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations
A man will be imprisoned in a room with a door that's unlocked and opens inwards; as long as it does not occur to him to pull rather than push it.
Wittgenstein, Culture and Value I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy when I said: philosophy ought really to be written only as a poetic composition.
Culture and Value

He had this thing about what you could say
And what you couldn't say but only show.
To make that point, he thought, the only way Was to push 'say' as far as it would go.
With that in mind he'd put up an array
Of reasonings more geometrico,
Along with a meticulous display
Of numbered parts that made it seem as though
The thing was too well-built to go astray. 
